ᮊ
Having studied organisational and accounting reports for some considerable time I became disenchanted with those reports which appeared shallow and uninteresting; and it became clear to me that a broad philosophical investigation was required. I turned to what has become known as the liberal-communitarian debate after inspiration from David ( ) Parker's 1994 Ethics, Theory and the Novel. He uses Taylor's communitarian arguments which offer a powerful challenge to ethical criticism and Neo-Nietzchean literary theory to interpret differences. These arguments extend to accounting itself an instrumental discourse based on economic means to calculation and control. David Parker's work is important because it offers, through communitarian theory, an alternate means to think about the construction of a text 1 . ( ) Furthermore, having read Charles Taylor's 1989 Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identityᎏ itself a source for Parker's means to interpret texts ᎏ I became convinced that a satisfactory discussion of humanity's constitutive relationships required examination of conceptions of rationality deriving from the eighteenth century Enlightenment. This argument owes much to Taylor's discussion of communitarianism and his attempt to overcome the alienation of modern life 2 . Taylor argues that modern discourses offer only a fragmented understanding of what it means to be a person.
Communitarianism relates considerations of the quality of life to general cultural and social relationships. He draws upon the hermeneutic 3 method to explore the Enlightenment's conception of rationality, its commitment to autonomy and the way it offers only an instrumental mode of deliberation. Taylor examines the Enlightenment's stress on autonomy and the way it submerges political and ecological values. He argues that both modern and post-modern narratives offer only a partial account of what it means to be a person. Taylor offers an approach to interpret texts through what he calls authenticityᎏ extending our understanding of autonomy to consider processes of human self-realisation ( ) through exploring humanity's ''being in the world '' Ferrara, 1998 . Autonomy refers to human freedom and the ability to be impartial but authenticity demands contextualisation of that autonomy. The notion of authenticity helps us consider how Aristotle's ''practical reason'' can illuminate values other than those which reflect instrumental considerations.
More broadly the interpretive perspective developed here owes much to Taylor's interpretation of Martin Heidegger's argument that people are ( ) ''thrown into the world'' Dreyfus, 1994, pp. 173᎐174, 242᎐244 . People's identities are formed within cultural and linguistic traditions which frame the factors which have significance in their lives. Clearly one crucially significant factor is the way people relate to nature. Heideggerian thought, moreover, is relevant to considerations of what it means to be a person living a hectic life as if the processes of time are accelerating. Accounting assumes away these considerations and assumes that differences between communities, discourses and ideologies can be factored out of our interpretative deliberations.
In particular, Taylor's work on authenticity informs the argumentᎏ that the most convincing mode of interpretive argument must be built on communitarian premises. By way of introduction, Taylor canvasses liberal frameworks of modernity and their inadequate means of political deliberation while explaining the fragmented trajectory post-modernism takes us. He examines those liberal frameworks and counterposes authenticity to liberal proceduralism as a means to factor in the ethical dimensions in his interpretive framework. Taylor draws our attention to the poetic expressive tradition which works towards an exploration of humanity's being in the world and its relationships with nature.
Sources of Value and the Self
Since the apparent post-modern turn in evaluative discourse the realisation that all human agents are ''self-interpreting'' animals that define themselves against an evaluative ''background of distinctions of worth'' has been lost. Taylor asks us to consider and interpret ''being'' as a reflection of different evaluative sources as they impact on the self which pivot around, and are oriented by, and through moral space. As an instrumental discourse accounting severs its mode of deliberation from the background as if it is possible to be a neutral arbiter for communities writ large.
He takes us back to the Eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers who tended to liken the processes of nature to the workings of a machine. Central to Taylor's interpretive discourse is a series of arguments refuting naturalism where the human agent is oriented in moral space. To be without any evaluative framework at all would involve ''a profound psychic disorientation''ᎏto live without access to the good ᎏ the moral spaceᎏ is to lead a shallow and empty life. This is the picture he paints of Enlightenment thinkers where it is assumed that humanity has the technological capacity to solve the problems confronting it. Human beings were at the centre of the world as was clearly reflected in Collingwood's Hegel-inspired Idea of Nature, which held ''mind makes nature; nature is... a by-product of the autonomous and self-existing ( ) activity of mind ''. Collingwood, 1945, p. 7 . Moreover, instrumentalism ( was evident in John Stuart Mill's 1854 essay ''Nature' ' Mill, 1824, pp. ) 4 3᎐69 . For Collingwood and Mill the maxim to ''follow nature'' sounded like a return to an animistic ethic. For Mill, the injunction to follow nature is ambiguous since humanity had the capacity to master it:
Everybody professes to approve and admire many great triumphs of Art over Nature: the junction by bridges of shores which Nature had made separate, the draining of Nature's marshes, the excavation of her wells, the dragging to light of what she has buried at immense depths in the earth; the turning away of thunderbolts by lightning rods, of her inundations by embankments, of her ocean by breakwaters. But to commend these and similar feats, is to acknowledge that the ways of Nature are to be conquered, not obeyed: that her powers are often towards men in the position of enemies, from whom he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use, and deserves to be applauded when that little is rather more than might be expected from ( his physical weakness in comparison to those gigantic powers'' Mill, ) 1824, pp. 20᎐21 .
According to the above argument, nature was not only a barrier but actually humanity's antagonist 5 . To say the least, modern environmental theorists are more aware of the dangers of instrumentalism and anthropocentrism. But one can still find echoes of Mill's views among modern ''shallow green'' theorists who are sceptical of radical and deep-green ecology. Here we are far from traditional instrumental discourses those which dominate modernity and implicitly suppress the ( pivotal role of moral space this seems to be the implication of the dominant forms of accounting which fuses bald naturalism and ) neo-classical economics .
Taylor asks us what then are we to make of the injunction to '' follow nature''? Twentieth century analytical philosophers might consign the notion that nature possesses value to the category of ought statements concerning what people should do rather than a statement of fact. Others might say that simply to follow nature is hardly realistic in the modern world. But even if it is unrealistic, one does not have to jump to the conclusion that it is always better to impose humanity's imprint on nature. Aldo Leopold echoes Romantic poets in his famous ''land ethic'' which has been celebrated by many deep ecologists. Leopold [ ] insisted that '' a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends ( ) otherwise '' Leopold, 1970, p. 67 . Was this a radical rejection of Enlightenment anthropocentrism, as J. Baird Callicott and other deep ecologists maintain, or was it just a warning against its instrumentalism? On that question ecologists are divided. Though as Taylor reminds us the supposition that nature is a source of the self reflects Shelley's ideas that it is through poetry that the otherness of being is given reflection and:
'' the creation of actions according to the unchangeable forms of human nature... It creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated in our ( minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration'' Taylor, ) 1989, p. 389 .
For Shelly, the poet ''strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked and sleeping beauty which is the spirit of its forms '' 6 Taylor though does not reject modernity wholesale, nor does he offer an anarchist return to small-scale sustainable ecological communities who insist that the search for intrinsic value in nature is futile since all value depends on a valuing subject. He urges the development of a dialectical understanding of the relationship between freedom and hierarchy to work out how humanity can realign its practices with nature 7 . The major problem lies in social hierarchy which exacerbates capitalism's consumerism and wasteful duplication. Social hierarchy reflects domination which for the anarchist environmentalist Murray Bookchin:
''must be viewed as institutionalized relationships, relationships that living things literally institute or create but which are neither ruthlessly fixed by instinct on the one hand nor idiosyncratic on the other. By this, I mean that they must comprise a clearly social structure of coercive and privileged ranks that exist apart from the idiosyncratic individuals who seem to be dominant within a given community, a hierarchy that is guided by a social logic that goes beyond individual interactions or inborn patters of behavior'' 8 .
The opposite of domination is freedom 9
. For Bookchin, since modernity has created an insensitive culture which dominates nature and leads ultimately to its destruction, the only way to escape immanent ecological destruction is to return to small scale, decentralised communities and forms of governance which are in harmony with nature's spontaneous processes.
Since the focus is on domination, Bookchin criticises Marxism and other grand narratives which overlook the threat modes of domination pose to all life on the planet 10 . That is the problemᎏ not alienation as Marx conceived it. One wonders here whether he is fair to Marx. Marx, after all, developed a dialectical method demonstrating how humanity's creative labour power is constrained by social processes which limit progressive and emancipatory political proposals. Marx could well be interpreted as developing a method to explore social arrangements where workers might reach their full potential and that involves understanding the importance nature has for people's lives. One wonders whether Bookchin has adequately considered the social dilemmas nature poses for humanity. The argument that small-scale communities will create less damage to nature needs fuller elaboration. There is a need to explore further the resilient characteristics of capitalism which persist in causing wasteful consumption 11 . But more is needed. Marx and large numbers of political economists have explored the tendencies in economic systems towards disequilibrium. Some modern thinking, however, has noted those same tendencies in biological and other systems. Consider the arguments of Noble Prize-winning physicist Ilya Prigogine and his collaborator Isabella ( ) Stengers 1984 . Contrary to the machine analogy of the Enlightenment, they see ecosystems as exhibiting dynamic, non-equilibrium characteristics and not conforming to classical laws of thermodynamics. Ecosystems are ''dissipative structures '' 12 ''maintained by the matter and energy flowing through them''. ''Once formed, these structures, in order to keep their shape, need to dissipate entropy so that it will not build up within ( ) the system and kill it or return it to equilibrium . Because they produce high levels of entropy, they require high inputs of matter and energy '' 13 . The structures, moreover, are prone to random fluctuations which might result in what is known as a ''bifurcation point'', where the structure ( reorganises itself at a higher or lower level of complexity a possibility ) which cannot be predicted .
If it is the case that nature is a ''far-from-equilibrium'' system, it is particularly urgent to investigate humanity's impact on nature and design ways of living and being in a world prone to disequilibrium. We are far from the Enlightenment view which stressed the stable, repetitive and universal and missed the dynamic, indeterminate implications of the relationships between humanity and nature.
Of course one might argue that considerations of randomness and inderminancy might render us powerless. On the other hand there is sufficient literature on ''structured chaos'' for us to fashion ways of responding to it; perhaps in a modern equivalent of the old republican manner of handling Fortuna. At the very least considerations of far-from-equilibrium states challenge political and interpretative theory to reconsider the way it considers nature's value, the relationship between scientific reason and instrumental rationality and indeed the philosophical structures of modernity. All of which impact on how we think and act about modernity and its mechanisms to record and transmit data to communities.
Considerations of indeterminacy as outlined by Prigogine might lead to post-modern considerations. Post-modernists tend to be critical of Enlightenment reason. Indeed in Jean-François Lyotard's words they express incredulity towards all meta-narratives such as communitarianism, ( ) liberalism and socialism Lyotard, 1989 . Post-modern political theorists work toward decentring the subject and deconstructing all stable forms of social structure. They emphasise subjectivity, fragmentation and a need to deconstruct traditional metaphysical assumptions. Stressing the power of discourse, they argue that language does not reflect any objective conception of the good because all dialogue is a reflection of the subjective preferences of the speaker. Thus, the possibilities for interpretation are said to be limited because there is no meta-truth.
Post-modern theorising been subject to trenchant attacks by discourse theorists committed to interpretation. For example, post-modernism is denounced for a performative contradiction in making the universal ( statement that no universal truth claims exist Habermas, 1987, pp. ) 185᎐210 . The distinction between the local, partial and fragmentary as against the universal, representative and harmonious, moreover, can only ''be such if they are outside an awareness of their position as post-modern discourses''. At a practical level, some claim, post-modernism offers us few political alternatives save resistance to domination. By resistance political space may be created for different values but who is to say what are good values?
Have such theorists anything to say about discourses such as humanity and the environment? Some of them have tried to say something. There may be value in developing a post-modern critique of modernity and constructing sites of resistance to temper the excesses of modernity. Post-modernists might develop critical and imaginative responses to the ongoing problems of technological modernisation. They might aid thinking about the relationships between humanity and nature and develop relationships between states which are currently competing to increase their citizens' well-being. Advocacy of respect for ''otherness'', sensitivity to the resistance of local narratives to misleading grand narratives and the invocation to ''live playfully in the world'' and ''let things be'' could superficially support an ecological ethic. But playfulness might destroy nature. More generally, post-modernism might enhance an individualist instrumentalist outlook. A post-structural emphasis on discourse could lead to neglect of considerations of structural power wielded by trans-national corporations. A post-modern ''new age'', moreover, at worst, could be very destructive or perhaps simply a distracting attempt to create the ''hyper-real''. What, moreover, may one do with an open-ended politics which defies theorisation? Most seriously a contempt for ontology does not suggest good prospects for a post-modern environmental ethic. The issue of nature's intrinsic value will tend to be dismissed as nonsense. As will non-naturalistic values such as the art of ( ) interpretation phronesis which is captured in the spirit of poetry.
Taylor's Contribution
'' One way of putting this objection to MacIntyre's project is to say that he is trying to rule out of account one whole historical strand of which the modern self is constituted, what Charles Taylor calls the 'expressive' demand for self-realisation that was born in the Romantic movement. Taylor's monumental and compelling historical account of the making of the modern identity argues that we are made up of at least three mutually conflicting strands in which are intertwined all the important Western formative threads from classical antiquity to the present day. The three are: an other-regarding Kantian moral one that derives ultimately from the Judeo-Christian religious tradition; one that privileges disengaged rationality, autonomy freedom, human equality, and universality, which comes from the Enlightenment; and the Romantic one which emphasises the demands of nature, human fulfilment, and expressive ( ) integrity '' Parker, 1994, p. 20 . Like post-modernists, Taylor is critical of the Enlightenment but comes to very different conclusions. Taylor helps us unite considerations of the social and the ecological in a manner more fruitful than the deep and social ecological approaches and the post-modern approach sketched above. Like many of the above theorists, he is critical of the Enlightenment's instrumental reason and more particularly the focus on a procedural modus vivendi which characterises contemporary liberalism. Above all he bemoans the fact that the modern citizen ''is a citizen of nowhere, an internal exile wherever he lives... modern liberal society can appear only as a collection of citizens of nowhere who have banded together ( ) for their common protection '' MacIntyre, 1981, p. 156 . Rootless associations are hardly likely to be constitutive, ecological or socially aware.
According to Taylor, the Enlightenment emphasised a punctual under-standing of the human subject, defined in abstraction from any constitutive concernsᎏ in isolation from its community and significant attachments. It endorsed disengagement, seeing people as free if they are independent from external interference. It looked inward rather than to external thingsᎏ to the polis or republic and even less the environment. Morality, therefore became seen in terms of self-interest or in terms of ( de-contextualised ''right'' the most stark manifestation of which is in-) strumental accounting . In eighteenth century terms, which many philosophers have now forgotten, the Enlightenment collapsed ethics into ( ( Considerations of good structures which might be environmentally em-) bedded were displaced by considerations of principles of right behaviour.
The Enlightenment celebrated autonomy rather than authenticity, which affirm self-determination but not in isolation. Autonomy centred on a negative conception of freedom which is based on an atomistic conception of human nature. Expressive writers are committed to exploring these other sources of the self. People, therefore, were free when they stood apart from nature. That separation could easily turn into an affirmation of domination. Communitarians, Taylor feels, must back-track a little, consider how people reflect on the good and appreciate the extent to which nature may be seen as a source of the self, submerged by atomistic, pre-social and ahistorical conceptions of humanity. The aim is to show that nature is not just a constraint on freedom but helps to structure freedom.
The argument presented herein offers a contrary to interpretation to the old argument that classical liberalism is in harmony with free-market arguments which assume that, through incentive structures, humanity can rectify ecological and social damage. A communitarian-environmental ethic, on the other hand, must go further in charting the way that collective institutions may show how an appreciation of the ''other'' is necessary for the attainment of the good life 14 . But can a communitarian approach embrace the idea of intrinsic value? Taylor explicitly charts Romantic thought to explore how modernity suppresses non-instrumental values such as the supposition that humanity and nature are entwined where nature is a source of the self Taylor [ ] evokes memories of Rousseau, noting that humanity's '' c onscience is the voice of nature as it emerges in a being who has entered society ( ) and is endowed with language and hence reason '' Taylor, 1989, p. 359 . Surely a sense of intrinsic value occurs when people confront the natural environment. That sense, moreover, is unique, particular and historically-locatedᎏ a fact not easily addressed by many hard and soft ecologists unfamiliar with the romantic Counter-Enlightenment ideas associated with the work of Hamann, Herder and Humboldt.
It is easy to see why that is the case. John Rawls notwithstanding 15 , it is unfashionable nowadays to attempt to construct a philosophical position out of an intuitive sense. But that approach was once common. Many eighteenth century thinkers were concerned to show that humans were endowed with a moral sense, ''an intuitive feeling of right and wrong'':
''The original point of the doctrine was to combat a rival view, that knowing right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences, in particular those concerned with divine reward and punishment. The notion was that understanding right and wrong was not a matter of dry calculation, but was anchored in our feelings. Morality has, in a sense, ( ) a voice within us '' Taylor, 1992, p. 26 . Nor is romanticism all that fashionable. But romantic rebellion continually recurs:
''For the two powerful aspirationsᎏ to expressive unity and to radical autonomyᎏ have remained central to preoccupations of modern man; and hope to combine them cannot but recur in one form or another, be it in Marxism or integral to anarchism, technological Utopianism or the return to nature. The Romantic rebellion continues undiminished, returning ever in unpredictable new formsᎏ Dadaism, Surrealism, the yearning of the 'hippy', the contemporary cult of unrepressed consciousness. With all this surrounding us we cannot avoid being referred back to the first great synthesis which was meant to resolve our central dilemma: which ( failed but which remains somehow unsurpassed '' Taylor, 1975, pp. ) 49᎐50 .
To affirm morality's voice within us and to sympathise with romanticism, however, is not the same as affirming nature's intrinsic value independent of human beingsᎏ a step Taylor is unwilling to take. For him ''intrinsic'' value is a human-centred concept which reflects the values of the language bearer for whom nature possesses such value. We have to approach the value of nature through practical reasoning about freedom and how nature structures the possibilities of freedom, chart democratic-republican processes which may recover them and show self-interpreting humans other ways of being in the world.
Taylor never presents us with a philosophical defence of intrinsic value but, through his critique, he does offer us ways of thinking about the relationship between societies and a sense of value. Of importance here is the idea of ''insight'' into the values of different communitiesᎏ which might highlight elements of a common appreciation of intrinsic value. He is concerned with what he calls ''strong-evaluations'' such as cultural and environmental relationships which shape people's identities and which can not be captured by philosophical perspectives which aim ( to be universal in scope traditional accounting, neo-classical economics ) and free-market liberalism . By recognising the importance of ethical frameworks, Taylor's expressivism shows how humanity may re-align its understanding of what nature means and, through modern communicative structures, may take some steps towards moderating its impact on nature.
At a very practical level, given the probability that limits to growth are real, Taylor's work is useful in exploring the possible shape of ( ) steady-state communities Taylor, 1978 . Accounting's role would be to monitor the steady-state use of resources. In attempting this task through ( practical reasoning he avoids the pitfalls of shallow ecology which ) ( absolves citizens from personal responsibility and deep ecology which ) devalues humanity . As he put it:
''It seems to me that every anthropocentrism pays a terrible price in impoverishment in this regard. Deep ecologists tend to concur from one point of view, theists from another. And I am driven to this position ( ) from both '' Taylor, 1994, p. 13 . In summary, Taylor's work provides a means to explore the environmental implications of the liberal-communitarian debate and to retrieve an awareness of the different sources of the self as they impact on the formation of the modern identity. Taylor's work acts like a rudder in the formulation of a critical-ecological accounting model. Central to his position are criticisms of classical and procedural liberalism which offer only a narrow conception of practical reasoning limiting the means through which humanity may consider its relationships with nature. While never attributing an independent intrinsic value to nature, he remains sufficiently romantic to consider the ''voice of nature'' within us 16 . A communitarian-environmental ethic, therefore, involves identifying political relationships that will enable communities to approach the value in nature and to hear its voice while remaining both liberal and democratic.
Conclusion
The above discussion has sketched the weaknesses of Enlightenment rationality as a means to the management of human affairsᎏ something which poets have continually strived to overcome. Noting objections from deep ecologists, social ecologists, some system theorists and, of course, communitarians this essay has criticised liberal instrumentalism. It has canvassed the ecological consequences of the liberal maxim of taking principles of right as prior to, and independent of, the good, noting that, within its modus operandi, procedural liberalism has a tendency to displace investigation into more substantive relationships between humanity and nature. Accounting as a communicative medium has a role to play in this regard and overcome the instrumental discourse which alienates humanity.
The discussion has established the importance of Taylor for such an investigation. Taylor's best known ideas, expressed in his Hegel and Sources of the Self, are not concerned explicitly with the environment but they may be extended. He has, moreover, developed ecological arguments in a number of other works. The comments above have noted Taylor's objections to the limitations of neo-liberal and post-modern political frameworks. No longer can nature be viewed as a malleable input into production as traditional economic methodologies assume. Factually, far-from-equilibrium systems theorists and many others tell us, it is doubtful whether humanity has the technological capacity to control and master nature's processes? Even if it has, a consideration of other values such as humanity's relationships with nature are important. Taylor never makes the case for nature's independent ''intrinsic value'' and perhaps it is impossible so to do. But at least an awareness of nature's ''voice within'' should not be dismissed as out-of-date romanticism as instrumental rationality would contend.
More broadly does accounting as a communicative technology provide avenues for discussion and dissemination of the various sources of modern identities? Communitarian theory seems to offer hope on this score. It invites us to think about the means through which citizens might have direct access to the deliberations of government. It invites us also to think about the dangers of free-market liberalism to communities and communal sources of the self ᎏ which must include ecological and social considerations. Put another way, Taylor's framework squarely addresses questions of identity which must have ecological, cultural and social determinants. More broadly, communitarianism is sufficiently elastic to incorporate the insights of other political orientations be they Post-Hegelians, Earth Firsters and Counter-Culturalists who advocate preservation of the diversity of life on earth and question the fundamental tenets of modernity. Liberalism may also incorporate other frameworks including the insights of communitarians but is always bedeviled by its instrumental rationality and procedural orientation. Accounting, as a sibling of economics, is likewise flawed in its means of interpretation and deliberation. ''communitarian'', ''communitive'' and ''communist'' were used interchangeably, and that the term ''communist'' incorporated many diverse strands of thought until the early part of the 1920s; some deep ecologists use the term communitarian in a different sense, referring to a ''biotic community''. ( ) 3. Many hermeneutic positions exist and can be classified in the following way: a ( ) ( ) weak-hermeneutics Rorty , Depth Hermeneutic Habermas and Strong Hermeneutic ( ) Dreyfus, Gadamer, Heidegger, Taylor . Rorty defines the weak hermeneutic discourse as a non-realist philosophy and urges a complete withdrawal from ontological theorising. While Habermas argues against Gadamer's fusion of horizons because of its idealistic account of self understanding, Habermas' initial theory relied on a reading of Freud where the patient is able to emancipate herself from systematically distorted communication. Although Habermas has jettisoned his Freudian aspirations, he still maintains that the problem within modernity is that the philosophy of consciousness has been replaced by that of language. This has had the effect of transforming social change and understanding from the individual to the decisionistic and technocratic structures of communities. Habermas argues that his emancipatory goals can only be achieved through communicative action. Habermas maintains that the strong hermeneutics of Gadamer and Taylor lacks critical distance. cit., p. ix. He interprets Capital as offering a vision of community life where humanity masters nature's processes. Marx apparently was insensitive to the fact that domination pervades all existing social formations. Socialism and communism are simply different manifestations of the same Enlightenment rationality based on domination. 11. Later it will be argued that a critical-environmental ethic overlaps with a post-communitarian ethic concerned with the relationship between language and critical social theory. 12. Prigogine notes: We have given the name dissipative structure to these spatiotemporal organizations. Thermodynamics leads us to the formulation of two conditions for the ( ) occurrence of dissipative structures in chemistry: 1 far-from-equilibrium situations ( ) defined by a critical distance; and 2 catalyptic steps, such as the production of the intermediate compound Y from compound X together with the production of X and Y.
( ) See Brugger and Kelly 1990 . 13. Ibid., pp. 56᎐57. 14. The ''good'' is a phrase used in political theory to explain the factors that impact on what it means to be a human agent, self or individual. Taylor explains that ''the good'' has been submerged in modern political discussions because moral philosophy ( has focused on what it is right to do rather than what it is good to be Taylor, 1989, ) p. 3 . For Rawls the ''good'' is an ordered scheme of final ends which includes among other things the connection with the priority of the right which incorporates: ( ) ( ) ( ) a the idea of goodness as rationality, b the idea of primary goods, c the idea of ( ) permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good, d the idea of political virtues ( ) ( ) and e the idea of the good of a well-ordered political society. 15. Rawls distances himself from Ronald Dworkin's interpretation of his theory as a ( ) ( ) version of natural right by stressing the role of intuition: see Rawls, 1985, p. 236n . 16 . It is interesting here to compare Taylor's position with that of Sir Isaiah Berlin. Berlin believed that purposes are imposed on the world by human beings. Taylor, on the other hand, while never endorsing nature's independent intrinsic value argues that to understand nature involves exploring the ''voice of nature'' that emerges through the capacity of language; Berlin, I. '', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 1, 1994, p. 13 . Taylor, C., ''The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion'', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1998, pp. 143᎐156. 
